| Course | DNP855 Organizational Leadership and Systems-Based Practice |
|---|---|
| Module | Module 1 |
| Paper type | Systems analysis paper |
| Length | About 1,105 words, 7 pages |
| Format | APA 7 student paper |
| School | Aspen University |
| Program | DNP |
| Updated | October 2026 |
Free sample paper for DNP855 Module 1
Everyone Did Their Job: A Systems Analysis of a Critical Lab Result That Followed the Wrong Map
Student Name
Doctor of Nursing Practice Program, Aspen University
DNP855: Organizational Leadership and Systems-Based Practice
Instructor Name
Month Day, Year
Everyone Did Their Job: A Systems Analysis of a Critical Lab Result That Followed the Wrong Map
When a patient is harmed, organizations often look for the person who made the error. Systems thinking asks a different question: what features of the system made the harm likely, regardless of who was working? This paper analyzes a composite event in which a critical laboratory result did not reach the clinicians caring for a patient, using Reason's model of human error and the principles of systems thinking, and it proposes changes aimed at the system rather than at individuals.
The Event
Mr. B., a 71-year-old whose kidneys work at about a third of normal capacity, came onto a medical unit with pneumonia. At 1:40 a.m., after an episode of low blood pressure, he was transferred to the step-down unit. Blood drawn at 12:50 a.m. on the medical unit came back at 2:05 a.m. showing potassium at 6.8 mmol/L. Following protocol, the laboratory technologist phoned the critical value to the location listed on the specimen, the medical unit. The nurse who answered read the value back, wrote it down, and, not recognizing the patient's name among her assignments, told the technologist the patient was not hers; the technologist, working through a queue of critical calls, marked the call as completed. The result appeared in the electronic record, but the step-down nurse was admitting another patient and did not open the results tab. At 3:20 a.m., Mr. B. developed a wide-complex rhythm and required resuscitation. He survived.
The Person Approach and Why It Fails Here
Reason (2000) sets two ways of thinking about error side by side. One looks for the careless or forgetful individual and answers with blame, retraining, or discipline. The other starts from the fact that people will always make mistakes and asks what about their working conditions made this one likely. Under the person approach, the medical unit nurse would be faulted for not forwarding the call, the technologist for closing it, and the step-down nurse for not checking results. Yet each acted reasonably given what they knew and the demands on them. Disciplining one of them would leave the conditions unchanged, and the next critical result sent to the wrong unit would meet the same fate.
Latent Conditions and the Holes in the Defenses
Reason (2000) describes an organization's defenses as layers, each with holes of two kinds: slips and mistakes by frontline staff in the moment, which he calls active failures, and latent conditions, flaws that sit quietly in designs, policies, and budgets until the day they combine with something else. Harm occurs when holes in several layers line up. In this event, the layers and their holes were these: the laboratory's callback process routed results by specimen location, not by the patient's current location; the electronic record updated the patient's location at transfer but the laboratory system did not receive the update for results already in process; the critical-result policy allowed a call to be closed once read back, without confirming that the responsible clinician received it; the step-down unit had no alert that fired when a new critical result posted for a patient; and night staffing left the receiving nurse admitting two patients at once. No single hole caused the arrest; the harm passed through five of them, each opened by a decision made long before that night.
Systems Thinking: Structure Drives Behavior
Senge (2006) argues that the structure of a system, its relationships, feedback loops, and delays, generates its behavior, and that people inside a system tend to see only their own part. Each person in this event saw only their segment: the technologist saw a completed call, the medical unit nurse a patient who was not hers, the step-down nurse a busy admission. No one could see the whole path the result was supposed to travel. The transfer created a delay between the patient's movement and the information's movement, a classic source of error. Seeing the event as a system makes clear that the problem lies in how information follows patients during transfer, a structure that will produce similar failures for other results and other transfers.
The Scale of the Problem
The landmark report on patient safety argued that most errors result from faulty systems, processes, and conditions that lead people to make mistakes or fail to prevent them, and that the solution lies in designing safer systems rather than blaming individuals (Kohn et al., 2000). Communication failures at transitions are among the most common of these system weaknesses, and critical result communication after transfer is a recurring example. Mr. B. survived, but the same conditions could produce a death on another night.
System-Level Changes
The changes follow from the latent conditions. The laboratory should route critical calls to the patient's current location, drawn in real time from the admission-transfer system, and the interface should update in-process specimens at transfer. The critical-result policy should require that a call be closed only when the responsible nurse or provider acknowledges it, with escalation to the charge nurse or house supervisor if not reached within 15 minutes. The record should generate an interruptive alert to the assigned nurse and provider when a critical result posts. Transfer handoff should include pending laboratory tests. And the organization should review night staffing on units that routinely receive transfers during admissions. Each change is designed to close a hole regardless of who is working.
Leading a Just Response
How leaders respond after the event shapes whether the system learns. If the medical unit nurse or the technologist is disciplined, staff will learn that reporting near misses and admitting uncertainty carries risk, and the next hole in the defenses will stay hidden. A just culture approach distinguishes honest human error, which calls for system redesign and support, from at-risk behavior, which calls for coaching, and from reckless disregard, which calls for accountability. None of the three nurses or the technologist acted recklessly. The DNP-prepared leader's role is to say so publicly, thank the staff who reported the event, involve them in designing the fixes, and report back to all units on what changed. That response turns one near-fatal night into evidence that speaking up is safe.
Conclusion
Mr. B.'s arrest was not caused by any one person. It passed through a series of weaknesses in routing, information systems, policy, alerts, and staffing, each the product of earlier design decisions. Reason's model and systems thinking show why blaming individuals would fail and where the system must change. For DNP-prepared nurse leaders, the task is to look past the sharp end to the structures that shape what happens there.
References
Kohn, L. T., Corrigan, J. M., & Donaldson, M. S. (Eds.). (2000). To err is human: Building a safer health system. National Academies Press. https://doi.org/10.17226/9728
Reason, J. (2000). Human error: Models and management. BMJ, 320(7237), 768-770. https://doi.org/10.1136/bmj.320.7237.768
Senge, P. M. (2006). The fifth discipline: The art and practice of the learning organization (Rev. ed.). Doubleday.
What the DNP855 Module 1 instructions ask for
The first module of Aspen's DNP855 often asks you to treat a harmful event or a close call as a systems failure rather than an individual error. Choose an event where several people acted reasonably and harm still occurred. Describe the timeline precisely. Explain why blaming one person would not prevent recurrence, using a recognized model of error. Identify latent conditions, the flaws built into routing, technology, policy, staffing or design, and show how they lined up. Apply a systems thinking source to explain why each person saw only part of the picture. Propose changes that remove the conditions, not reminders to try harder. Address how leaders should respond to the staff involved. Keep the patient and hospital composite, and give times and values that make clinical sense.
Inside the DNP855 Module 1 example
The introduction contrasts asking who made the error with asking what made it likely. The event section gives the timeline from the 12:50 a.m. draw to the transfer, the 2:05 call to the medical unit and the arrest that followed. The person approach section shows why disciplining the technologist or the nurse would change nothing. The latent conditions section names five holes: location routing that did not follow the patient, specimens that kept the old unit, a policy that closed the call when anyone answered, alerts that did not reach step-down and thin night staffing. The Senge section explains why each person saw only a segment. The scale section draws on the Institute of Medicine report, and the changes and just culture sections propose fixes and a fair response.
Where the marks sit in the DNP855 Module 1 rubric
In DNP855, a systems analysis earns marks for an exact account of the event, correct use of an error model, identification of latent conditions, systems thinking and changes that fit the causes. This paper scores well because each proposed change answers a named latent condition, so a reader can trace each fix to its cause. Reason's 2000 BMJ article on human error supplies the person and system approaches and the layered defenses. Senge's revised edition of The Fifth Discipline from 2006 explains structure and behavior, and Kohn, Corrigan and Donaldson's 2000 report To Err Is Human sets the national frame. The just culture section matters because graders look for leadership, not only analysis. Avoiding blame throughout, while still naming active failures, shows the balance the module expects.
DNP855 Module 1 help from the desk
Systems papers often name the error model and then return to blaming a person in the recommendations. Keep the fixes at the system level. A second gap is a vague timeline; give times so the reader sees where the delay happened. Students also list causes without explaining how they combined. Show the holes lining up. Avoid recommendations such as more education or remind staff, which leave the conditions in place. Distinguish active failures from latent conditions accurately. Address the staff involved and how leaders should respond. Use a composite event and never describe a real one in identifiable detail. End with what a DNP-prepared leader would do in the first week after the event, since action is what the course is building toward.
Write yours, or have the desk draft it
This paper is an original model document written by our desk, not a submitted student paper and not an official Aspen University document. Read it for the moves, then write your own to the instructions in your classroom. If you want one built to your exact prompt and rubric, the first custom sample is free and arrives in 24 to 48 hours.
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DNP855 Module 1 questions, answered
What does DNP855 Module 1 usually ask for?
The first module often introduces systems thinking through an adverse event or failure that no single person caused, asking you to analyze it at the system level. Aspen does not publish module deliverables, so your classroom's instructions govern.
What is the difference between active failures and latent conditions?
In Reason's model, active failures are unsafe acts by people at the sharp end, while latent conditions are weaknesses built into the system by design, policy and resource decisions. Harm occurs when holes in several layers of defense line up.
Why doesn't blaming individuals prevent errors?
Because the conditions that led competent people to err remain in place. The system approach changes those conditions, such as routing, alerts, policies and staffing, so the same failure is less likely whoever is working.
Where can I find a free DNP855 Module 1 sample paper?
The full DNP855 Module 1 paper is above, analyzing a critical potassium result sent to a unit the patient had left, as a failure no single person caused.
What are latent conditions in a DNP855 systems analysis?
Latent conditions are flaws built into routing, technology, policy or staffing that sit unnoticed until they combine. The example names five, from lab call routing to thin night staffing.