EDO 810 Module 6 Power, Politics and Networks Example

Three Chiefs, One Floor: Power, Dependence and the Weak Ties That Could Hold a Merged 911 Authority Together

Student Name

Doctor of Education Program, Aspen University

EDO 810: Organizational Theory

Instructor Name

Month Day, Year

Three Chiefs, One Floor: Power, Dependence and the Weak Ties That Could Hold a Merged 911 Authority Together

Five years after the Tri-County Emergency Communications Authority was formed, its three founding agencies still treat it as partly theirs. The sheriff wants more dispatchers dedicated to rural patrols, the city police chief wants faster handling of downtown calls, and the fire chief wants medical calls prioritized ahead of both. Each holds a seat on the authority's board with a veto over the budget, and last year's budget took seven months to pass. While it waited, the authority ran on the prior year's figures, delaying two hires and a radio console upgrade that all three agencies said they wanted. On the floor, telecommunicators from the three old centers still sit together, eat together and train newcomers in their old ways. This paper analyzes power, politics and networks at the authority and proposes a strategy for its director. The authority, its leaders and its figures are invented.

Power as Dependence

Hillman et al. (2009) reviewed three decades of research on resource dependence theory, which originated in Pfeffer and Salancik's argument that organizations are not self-sufficient and are constrained by the external parties that control resources they need. The more critical a resource and the fewer its alternative sources, the more power the controlling party holds. Organizations respond by managing dependence through tactics such as mergers, joint ventures, board appointments that bring powerful outsiders inside, political action and diversifying sources. The review found broad empirical support for the theory's core claims, while noting that research had concentrated on some tactics more than others.

The Authority's Dependencies

The map explains the stalled budgets. Each founding agency supplies a critical resource for which the authority has no substitute, and the merger agreement converted that dependence into a formal veto. Resource dependence theory predicts exactly the political pattern the board displays: each party uses its control to secure its priorities, and decisions wait until all three are satisfied.

Influence in the Informal Network

Brass (1984) studied nonsupervisory employees in a newspaper publishing company and mapped their positions in work flow, communication and friendship networks. Employees who were central in these networks, who had access to many others and controlled the flow of work and information, were rated as more influential by supervisors and peers and were more likely to be promoted, beyond what their formal positions predicted. Influence, in his account, came partly from being in the right place in the structure.

A simple survey at the authority asked each telecommunicator whom they go to for advice on a hard call. Two dispatchers from the old city center were named by 41 of 112 respondents, far more than any supervisor. They are central in the advice network, and their views about protocols and shift practices carry more weight on the floor than official memos. Any change the director attempts will succeed or fail partly through them.

Three Islands

Granovetter (1973) argued that the strength of an interpersonal tie depends on time, emotional intensity, intimacy and reciprocity, and that weak ties play a distinctive role. Close friends tend to know the same people and the same things, so strong ties form dense clusters. Acquaintances, by contrast, often belong to different clusters, so weak ties act as bridges carrying new information and opportunities between groups. A network with few weak ties fragments into cliques that cannot coordinate.

The authority's floor has that shape. The survey found that 84% of advice ties ran within the three legacy groups. The groups are internally strong, which explains why each preserves its old practices, and almost no weak ties connect them, which explains why lessons learned on one side of the room, such as a better way to handle multi-vehicle crashes, do not travel to the others.

Strategy for the Director

How the Chiefs Might Respond

The proposal to let budgets pass by two of three votes will meet resistance, since it takes away the very veto that gives each founding agency its bargaining strength. Resource dependence theory suggests a trade: an agency gives up some control when it gains something it values more. The fire district, the smallest funder, has the most to gain from a rule that prevents the two larger partners from stalling its medical priorities, and the city, whose downtown calls suffered most during last year's delay, may also see benefit. The sheriff, who controls the largest local share, will likely resist. The director's task is to assemble two partners for the change while offering the third a guaranteed review of rural staffing every year, so that losing the veto does not mean losing a voice.

The Ethics of Working the Network

Using an understanding of power and networks raises ethical questions. A director who courts central dispatchers or reshapes shift teams could be seen as manipulative. The strategy above is defensible because it is transparent, serves the authority's mission of answering every caller equally and gives more people, not fewer, a voice in decisions.

Conclusion

Power at the authority flows from the resources its founding agencies control and from positions in an informal network that the organization chart does not show. Hillman, Withers and Collins explain the budget stalemate, Brass explains why two dispatchers matter more than their titles and Granovetter explains why three legacy groups remain apart. Diversifying funding, building bridging ties and giving informal leaders formal roles offer the director a way forward.

References

Brass, D. J. (1984). Being in the right place: A structural analysis of individual influence in an organization. Administrative Science Quarterly, 29(4), 518-539. https://doi.org/10.2307/2392937

Granovetter, M. S. (1973). The strength of weak ties. American Journal of Sociology, 78(6), 1360-1380. https://doi.org/10.1086/225469

Hillman, A. J., Withers, M. C., & Collins, B. J. (2009). Resource dependence theory: A review. Journal of Management, 35(6), 1404-1427. https://doi.org/10.1177/0149206309343469