HCA 320 Module 4 Medicaid Coverage Gap Analysis Example

Reviewed by Douglas Renshaw, MBA Aspen University Updated October 2026

This HCA 320 Module 4 sample paper analyzes the Medicaid coverage gap in Kestrel, a composite non-expansion state of 5.1 million people where 128,400 adults fall between Medicaid's income limit and the floor for marketplace tax credits. Healthcare Policy and Economics is a course in Aspen University's Health Care Administration program, and Module 4 asks for a policy and economics analysis. The paper prices the problem using KFF's coverage gap analysis and national expenditure data, explains why the market leaves the gap open when an unsubsidized silver premium runs about $480 a month and uses Baicker's Oregon study for evidence on what coverage changes. It recommends expansion to 138 percent of poverty with the state share financed by a hospital tax, drawing on MACPAC and ASPE, and works out who actually bears the cost, with KFF's employer survey for context.

CourseHCA 320 Healthcare Policy and Economics
ModuleModule 4
Paper typePolicy and economics analysis
LengthAbout 1,200 words, 7 pages
FormatAPA 7 student paper
SchoolAspen University
ProgramHealth Care Administration
UpdatedOctober 2026

Free sample paper for HCA 320 Module 4

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Medicaid Expansion in a Composite Non-Expansion State: The Coverage Gap, the Financing Mechanism, and Who Bears the Cost

[Author Name]

Health Care Administration Program, Aspen University

HCA 320 Healthcare Policy and Economics

Module 4 Assignment

[Faculty Name]

August 11, 2026

Kestrel is a composite state written as a model document. No real state, hospital or resident is described.

What this page is doingThe title states the policy, the setting and the analytic question, which is what a policy reader scans for first. The affiliation line names the program rather than an invented department, and the module line uses the query form students actually type, because Aspen does not publish a deliverable name here. The last line marks the state as a composite. A title that names both the mechanism and the incidence question tells a grader the paper has an argument rather than a subject heading.
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The Coverage Problem in Heads and Dollars

Kestrel is a composite state of 5.1 million people that has not adopted the Affordable Care Act Medicaid expansion. Its Medicaid program covers parents up to 26 percent of the federal poverty level and covers childless adults not at all, while premium tax credits in the marketplace begin at 100 percent of that level. The result is a band of income that qualifies for nothing. Against the 2025 guideline of $15,650 for a single-person household (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 2025), an uninsured line cook earning $9,000 a year sits at 58 percent of poverty: too well paid for Kestrel Medicaid, too poorly paid for a subsidy. An estimated 128,400 adults occupy that band, part of the roughly 1.5 million counted nationally across the states that have not expanded (KFF, 2025).

The gap is already expensive. It is simply paid for somewhere other than a budget line. Kestrel hospitals reported $1.42 billion in uncompensated care in 2024, equal to 4.9 percent of statewide net patient revenue, and the nine rural hospitals in the eastern counties carried a median uncompensated care share of 11.2 percent against a median operating margin of negative 1.4 percent. Two of those hospitals closed obstetric services in the last three years. On the household side, most adults in the gap are working: food service, residential construction, home care and seasonal agriculture, in jobs where an employer offer is uncommon. Their medical debt does not disappear when a bill goes unpaid. It moves to collections, to credit files, and back to the emergency department as care that waited.

Scale sets the boundary of any realistic recommendation. National health spending reached $4.9 trillion in 2023, or 17.6 percent of gross domestic product (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 2024), and the average annual premium for employer family coverage reached $25,572 in 2024, of which workers contributed $6,296 (KFF, 2024). A worker earning $9,000 a year cannot buy into a market whose family product costs nearly three times that income, and no plausible amount of price shopping changes the arithmetic. The policy question in Kestrel is therefore not whether the gap population will be subsidized, but through which mechanism and on whose books the subsidy appears.

What this page is doingEvery figure carries a year, a denominator and a source, which is most of the difference between a policy paper and an opinion. The gap is defined by the two eligibility rules that create it rather than described as unfairness, so a reader can check the mechanism instead of trusting the writer. The status quo is priced before anything is proposed, which sets up the only comparison that matters later. Ending on whose books the subsidy appears turns the rest of the paper into an incidence problem.
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Why the Market Leaves the Gap Open

Insurance is bought when its expected value exceeds its price, and for this income band the price is disqualifying. The unsubsidized benchmark silver premium for a 40-year-old in Kestrel runs about $480 a month, or $5,760 a year, which is 64 percent of a $9,000 income before a single deductible dollar. Demand at that price sits near zero, and the people who would still buy are the ones who already know they need care. That is adverse selection working exactly as theory predicts: the pool that forms at an unsubsidized price is sicker than average, the premium rises to match it, and the healthier remainder leaves. An individual market cannot reach this band on its own, not because regulation has failed, but because price and income do not meet.

The care those adults do receive is financed by cross-subsidy rather than by nothing. Hospitals recover part of their uncompensated care through disproportionate share payments funded with federal and state dollars, and part through the prices they negotiate with commercial insurers, which reach households as premium growth and reach workers as wages that did not rise. That is the political economy of the present arrangement: the money is already being spent, but it is spent with no eligibility rules, no per-enrollee price, no primary care attached and no line in any appropriation debate. A cost hidden inside a premium generates no vote. Naming where that cost currently lands is the first obligation of a policy analysis, because the honest comparison is never expansion against zero.

The evidence also limits what expansion can be promised to deliver. The Oregon Health Insurance Experiment, which used a lottery to create a randomized comparison, found that Medicaid coverage increased use of health care services, sharply reduced catastrophic out-of-pocket spending and lowered rates of depression, while two-year measures of blood pressure, cholesterol and glycated hemoglobin did not improve at a statistically detectable level (Baicker et al., 2013). A recommendation resting on measurable population health gain within a single term of office overstates that evidence. The defensible case is financial protection, a regular source of care, and moving an existing cost onto a budget where it can be seen and managed.

What this page is doingThis sheet does the economics rather than gesturing at it. Price is set against income, adverse selection is explained as a consequence rather than named as a term, and the cross-subsidy is followed to the households already paying it. The paragraph on the Oregon experiment is the move that earns trust, because it reports the null results beside the favorable ones and narrows the claim the recommendation is allowed to make. Graders reward a writer who limits their own argument with evidence.
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The Mechanism and Its Incidence: Who Actually Pays

The mechanism recommended here is adoption of the expansion to 138 percent of the federal poverty level, with the state share financed by a broad-based hospital tax rather than from the general fund. The arithmetic is stated so it can be checked. At an assumed per-enrollee cost of $6,800 a year, covering 128,400 adults costs about $873 million annually. The federal government pays 90 percent under the expansion match, or $786 million, leaving a state share near $87 million. A uniform tax of 3.4 percent of net patient revenue on hospitals above a $50 million revenue threshold raises an estimated $95 million, which covers the match with $8 million left for eligibility administration. The rate stays under the 6 percent of net patient revenue limit federal rules place on provider taxes and applies uniformly rather than returning each dollar to its payer (Medicaid and CHIP Payment and Access Commission, 2024).

Incidence decides whether the recommendation is honest. Federal taxpayers carry 90 percent of program cost, and the temporary five percentage point increase in the regular federal match available to newly expanding states adds an estimated $210 million over two years, enough to build eligibility systems without a general fund appropriation. Hospitals carry the state share, and for most of them it is a good trade: an estimated $310 million of uncompensated care converts to paid claims against $95 million in tax. The trade is not uniform. Specialty and suburban hospitals that treat few uninsured patients pay more than they save, and part of what they pay will surface in commercial prices, which returns to insured households as premium growth. Enrollees pay little by statute. The state carries the political risk that a future Congress reduces the 90 percent match, so the enabling law should carry a trigger that reopens the program if the federal share falls.

Judging the decision requires measures set before the vote rather than after it. Over three years the analysis would track the adult uninsured rate, with a target of moving from 14.8 percent to below 9 percent; enrollment against the 128,400 adults identified as eligible; uncompensated care as a share of net patient revenue statewide and in the nine rural hospitals; the operating margins of those hospitals; and the volume of medical debt in collections. One methodological caution belongs in the recommendation itself. States that expanded differ from states that did not in economy, politics and baseline health, so a simple before-and-after comparison invites a false claim of causation, and a defensible evaluation would use a synthetic control or a border-county design.

What this page is doingThe arithmetic is written so a reader can check it line by line: enrollment, per-enrollee cost, federal share, state share, tax rate, yield. Incidence is then traced past the obvious payer to the hospitals that lose on the trade and the commercial premiums that absorb part of it. The recommendation carries a trigger clause for the risk it cannot control, and the evaluation names a design that would survive challenge. Admitting the weakness of a before-and-after comparison is what separates analysis from advocacy.
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References

Baicker, K., Taubman, S. L., Allen, H. L., Bernstein, M., Gruber, J. H., Newhouse, J. P., Schneider, E. C., Wright, B. J., Zaslavsky, A. M., & Finkelstein, A. N. (2013). The Oregon experiment: Effects of Medicaid on clinical outcomes. New England Journal of Medicine, 368(18), 1713-1722.

Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services. (2024). National health expenditure data: Historical. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. https://www.cms.gov/data-research/statistics-trends-and-reports/national-health-expenditure-data

KFF. (2024). 2024 employer health benefits survey. https://www.kff.org/health-costs/report/2024-employer-health-benefits-survey/

KFF. (2025). The coverage gap: Uninsured poor adults in states that do not expand Medicaid. https://www.kff.org/medicaid/issue-brief/the-coverage-gap-uninsured-poor-adults-in-states-that-do-not-expand-medicaid/

Medicaid and CHIP Payment and Access Commission. (2024). Provider taxes. https://www.macpac.gov/subtopic/provider-taxes/

U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Office of the Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation. (2025). Poverty guidelines. https://aspe.hhs.gov/poverty-guidelines

Reading the HCA 320 Module 4 assignment instructions

Aspen's HCA 320 Module 4 commonly asks for an analysis of a health policy problem using economic reasoning. Describe the problem in people and dollars, with sources. Explain why the market does not solve it, using prices and incentives. Bring evidence on what the proposed policy would change. Recommend a financing mechanism and show the arithmetic. Work out who ultimately pays, not only what it costs. Use authoritative sources such as KFF, CMS and MACPAC. Set measures before the policy starts, with targets and a time frame. Keep the state composite. Explain incidence carefully, since a tax placed on hospitals may be passed on to insurers, employers or patients.

How this HCA 320 Module 4 example is built

The problem section describes Kestrel's population, the income limits for parents and childless adults and the 128,400 adults in the gap, most of them working in food service, construction, home care and farming. It reports $1.42 billion in uncompensated hospital care and the strain on nine rural hospitals. The market section explains why insurance is not bought when the premium is about $5,760 a year for a low-income adult. It reports what coverage changed in the Oregon experiment. The mechanism section recommends expansion to 138 percent of poverty, explains the federal match and finances the state share with a broad-based hospital tax. It shows the arithmetic. The incidence section shows federal taxpayers carrying 90 percent, hospitals trading $95 million in tax for about $310 million of uncompensated care turned into paid claims, and suburban hospitals passing part of their cost into commercial prices.

HCA 320 Module 4 rubric: what earns full marks

Policy and economics papers in HCA 320 earn marks for a quantified problem, sound market reasoning, evidence on effects, a financing mechanism with arithmetic and an analysis of incidence. This example scores well because it goes beyond cost to ask who actually pays. KFF's 2025 coverage gap analysis and CMS national expenditure data define the problem, Baicker and colleagues' 2013 New England Journal of Medicine study supplies evidence and MACPAC's provider tax page and ASPE guidance support the mechanism. KFF's 2024 employer survey informs how costs pass to employers. Showing the calculation lets graders check the reasoning step by step.

HCA 320 Module 4 help: mistakes that cost marks

Policy papers often stop at what a program costs. Ask who pays. Another common gap is explaining the coverage gap without prices; show the premium against income. Students also cite Medicaid expansion evidence loosely. Report what the Oregon study found and did not find. Show the financing arithmetic. Explain how a provider tax works and its federal limits. Keep the state composite and its arithmetic visible. Avoid partisan language, and note the risk that the federal match could change. Finally, consider who gains, such as hospitals with less uncompensated care, since incidence analysis is incomplete if it counts only the costs.

Write yours, or have the desk draft it

This paper is an original model document written by our desk, not a submitted student paper and not an official Aspen University document. Read it for the moves, then write your own to the instructions in your classroom. If you want one built to your exact prompt and rubric, the first custom sample is free and arrives in 24 to 48 hours.

More HCA 320 and Health Care Administration sample papers

HCA 320 Module 4 questions, answered

What does the HCA 320 Module 4 assignment usually ask for?

Aspen does not publish module-by-module deliverable names for this course, so read your classroom instructions and rubric first. In many sections this module asks for a policy and economics analysis: a defined cost or coverage problem, real figures with their sources, a proposed mechanism, and an account of who bears the cost. The paper on this page is written as that genre.

Where do I get real numbers for a health policy paper?

Use the agencies that publish the data rather than a secondary article quoting them. National spending comes from the CMS national health expenditure tables, premium and coverage figures from KFF, Medicaid financing rules from MACPAC, and income thresholds from the federal poverty guidelines. Give every figure its year and its denominator, because a number without both is not yet evidence.

How do I write about who pays for a policy instead of only what it costs?

Follow each dollar to a person. A federal match means federal taxpayers. A provider tax means hospitals first, then the commercial prices they negotiate, then premiums and wages. Cost sharing means enrollees. Name the parties that lose on the trade as well as the ones that gain, and say plainly which of them can pass their share along to someone else.

Where can I find a free HCA 320 Module 4 sample paper?

The full HCA 320 Module 4 paper is above, an economic analysis of the Medicaid coverage gap in a composite non-expansion state and who would pay to close it.

Who pays for Medicaid expansion in HCA 320 Module 4?

Federal taxpayers carry 90 percent. Hospitals pay the state share through a 3.4 percent tax but gain about $310 million in paid claims, while hospitals with few uninsured patients push some cost into commercial premiums.