MGT 464 Module 2 Motivation at Work Example

Reviewed by Douglas Renshaw, MBA Aspen University Updated October 2026

This MGT 464 Module 2 sample paper diagnoses why staff accountants at a composite CPA firm in Albany, New York, are leaving after busy season, even though the firm pays a bonus pool of $310,000 for those months. Aspen University's Organizational Behavior course examines why people put effort into work, and a busy season of sixty-hour weeks tests motivation hard. Vroom's expectancy theory shows the bonus fails because staff cannot see how their effort turns into a larger share. Adams's equity theory explains the resentment staff feel when they compare their hours and rewards with peers. Colquitt and colleagues' meta-analysis shows that fair procedures and honest explanations matter as much as the amount paid. A table traces the bonus through expectancy, instrumentality and valence, and the plan publishes criteria, explains decisions and gives staff a voice in scheduling.

CourseMGT 464 Organizational Behavior
ModuleModule 2
Paper typeMotivation analysis
LengthAbout 1,069 words, 6 pages
FormatAPA 7 student paper
SchoolAspen University
ProgramBusiness Administration
UpdatedOctober 2026

Free sample paper for MGT 464 Module 2

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Sixty-Hour Weeks and a Bonus No One Can Explain: Expectancy, Equity and Justice at a Regional CPA Firm

Student Name

Business Administration Program, Aspen University

MGT 464: Organizational Behavior

Instructor Name

Month Day, Year

What this page is doingThe title states the two features of the job that drive the motivation problem. APA 7 student title page.
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Sixty-Hour Weeks and a Bonus No One Can Explain: Expectancy, Equity and Justice at a Regional CPA Firm

Hudson Ledger CPA Group, a composite regional accounting firm in Albany, New York, prepares tax returns and audits for businesses and individuals. Its 38 staff and senior accountants work about 60 hours a week from February through mid-April, when most tax returns are due. To reward that effort, the partners distribute a busy season bonus pool, last year $310,000, averaging about $8,200 per person but ranging from $2,000 to $19,000. Within three months after last busy season, eight accountants left, most for corporate jobs with steadier hours. Exit interviews mention burnout, but also that bonuses "seemed random." The partners want to understand what is happening to motivation.

Expectancy Theory

Vroom (1964) explained motivation as a calculation people make, often without noticing, about whether effort is worth it. Three beliefs enter the calculation. Expectancy is the belief that trying harder will produce better performance. Instrumentality is the belief that better performance will bring particular outcomes. Valence is how much a person wants those outcomes. Motivation is weak if any of the three is near zero, however strong the others are.

LinkEvidence at Hudson LedgerStrength
Expectancy: effort leads to performanceStaff know long hours finish more returns and audits accuratelyStrong
Instrumentality: performance leads to bonusPartners divide the pool privately; staff cannot connect bonus size to hours, quality or client feedbackWeak
Valence: bonus is valuedMany value money; several say time off after busy season matters moreMixed
What this page is doingStaff believed their effort made a difference to clients; they did not believe it made a difference to their bonus.
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Equity Theory

Adams (1963) argued that people judge fairness by comparison. Each person weighs what they put in, effort, hours, skill, against what they get out, pay, recognition, opportunity, and compares that ratio with the ratios of people around them. When the ratios seem unequal, people feel tension and act to reduce it, by working less, asking for more, changing whom they compare with or leaving. At Hudson Ledger, bonuses are not published, but staff talk. Accountants who logged the most hours learned that colleagues with fewer hours received similar or larger bonuses, apparently because they worked on partners' favored clients. The resulting sense of inequity helps explain why several of the hardest workers left.

Organizational Justice

Colquitt et al. (2001) pooled studies of fairness at work and distinguished four kinds. Distributive justice concerns whether outcomes are fair. Procedural justice concerns whether the process used to decide is fair, for example consistent, accurate and open to input. Interpersonal justice concerns whether people are treated with dignity, and informational justice concerns whether decisions are explained honestly. They found that the kinds of justice were related but distinct, and that procedural justice related strongly to outcomes such as job satisfaction and organizational commitment, while distributive justice related most strongly to satisfaction with outcomes. Hudson Ledger's bonus fails procedural and informational justice: there are no criteria and no explanations.

Hours and Exhaustion

Motivation theories explain how rewards are judged, but the hours themselves matter. Sixty-hour weeks for ten weeks leave little room for family or rest, and several exit interviews described the last weeks of busy season as exhausting. Expectancy theory helps here too: when people are worn out, the belief that more effort will produce better work weakens, because tired accountants make more mistakes. Protecting some rest is not only humane; it keeps expectancy strong when the firm needs it most.

The Partners' View

The partners resisted publishing criteria at first. Some worried that formulas would ignore contributions that are hard to measure, such as training a junior colleague or calming an angry client. Others feared that publishing criteria would lead to arguments over every point. Colquitt and colleagues' findings suggest the reverse: when people understand and can question a process, they accept its outcomes more readily, even unfavorable ones. The teamwork portion of the criteria gives partners room for contributions that numbers miss, as long as they explain them.

Why Accountants Leave

The three theories fit together. Weak instrumentality means more effort brings no visible reward. Perceived inequity makes the hardest workers feel exploited. And a secret process with no explanations makes even generous bonuses feel arbitrary. Burnout from long hours adds pressure, but corporate jobs also offer something the firm does not: rewards that seem predictable.

Recommendations

The partners will publish bonus criteria before busy season: hours billed, 40%; quality, measured by review notes per engagement, 30%; and client feedback and teamwork, 30%. Each accountant will receive a written explanation of their bonus with their scores, delivered in a meeting with their manager. Staff will be able to trade up to half their bonus for added paid days off in May, recognizing different valences. Before busy season, staff will help set the schedule, including one protected weekend day off every other week.

Valuing Different Rewards

Asking staff what they value showed wide differences. Newer accountants with student loans valued cash most. Several parents valued predictable weekends during busy season above any bonus. Senior accountants nearing the CPA exam valued study time in the summer. Offering a choice between cash and time off recognizes these differences in valence at almost no cost, and it signals that the firm sees its staff as individuals.

Introducing the Changes

The managing partner will present the new criteria to all staff in January and invite questions, and staff representatives will review the process after the season.

Costs

The changes cost little money. The bonus pool stays the same size. Extra days off chosen instead of bonus money cost the firm the value of that time in May, a slow month. Writing explanations will take each manager about an hour per accountant. Against this, replacing an experienced accountant costs the firm an estimated $25,000 in recruiting and lost productivity, so keeping even two more accountants a year would more than repay the effort.

Measures

The firm will track turnover in the six months after busy season, a short survey on whether bonuses feel fair and understandable and the share of staff choosing extra days off.

Conclusion

Hudson Ledger's accountants are not unmotivated by money; they cannot see how their effort earns it, and they compare unfavorably with peers through a process they cannot see. Vroom's expectancy theory locates the break in instrumentality, Adams's equity theory explains the resentment and Colquitt and colleagues' research shows that fair procedures and honest explanations are as important as the amount paid.

References

Adams, J. S. (1963). Toward an understanding of inequity. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 67(5), 422-436. https://doi.org/10.1037/h0040968

Colquitt, J. A., Conlon, D. E., Wesson, M. J., Porter, C. O. L. H., & Ng, K. Y. (2001). Justice at the millennium: A meta-analytic review of 25 years of organizational justice research. Journal of Applied Psychology, 86(3), 425-445. https://doi.org/10.1037/0021-9010.86.3.425

Vroom, V. H. (1964). Work and motivation. Wiley.

What the MGT 464 Module 2 instructions ask for

Why people work hard, or stop, is the question behind Module 2 of Aspen's MGT 464; expect to diagnose a slump in effort and propose fixes grounded in motivation theory. The instructions for Module 2 in your classroom take priority; this example works through one firm's staff. Describe the motivation problem with evidence such as turnover or survey results. Apply at least two motivation theories, showing where each points to a cause. Consider fairness, since people judge rewards by comparison and by how decisions are made. Recommend changes linked to the causes found, with their costs. Explain how the changes will be introduced and how the firm will know whether motivation improves.

How the MGT 464 Module 2 example is put together

The paper opens with Hudson Ledger CPA Group, where 38 staff and senior accountants work about 60 hours a week from February to April. Eight left within three months of last busy season. The bonus pool is divided by partners without stated criteria. Vroom's book on work and motivation explains effort as a product of expectancy, instrumentality and valence. A table shows strong expectancy that effort produces good work, weak instrumentality because bonuses seem unrelated to performance and mixed valence because some staff value time off more than money. Adams's Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology article explains comparisons of outcomes to inputs. Colquitt and colleagues' 2001 meta-analysis separates fairness of outcomes from fairness of process, of treatment and of explanations. The plan publishes bonus criteria, explains each award and lets staff trade part of a bonus for extra days off.

Reading the MGT 464 Module 2 grading rubric

Motivation papers are graded on accurate use of theory, evidence-based diagnosis and recommendations that address the causes identified. This example applies expectancy theory link by link in a table, so the weak point is visible. Adams's equity theory explains why staff compare themselves with peers, and Colquitt and colleagues' meta-analysis shows that procedures and explanations shape reactions as much as amounts. Recommendations follow the diagnosis: clear criteria fix instrumentality, choice of rewards addresses valence and explanations address justice. Measures cover retention and staff perceptions, and the paper addresses the partners' concerns about publishing criteria.

MGT 464 Module 2 help: mistakes that cost marks

Motivation papers often recommend more money or recognition without asking why current rewards fail. Trace how effort leads to rewards in the actual workplace and where the chain breaks. Apply theories precisely, defining their elements. Consider fairness from employees' view, including how decisions are made and explained. Remember that people value different rewards, so ask them. Gather evidence, such as exit interviews or surveys, to support your diagnosis. Make recommendations specific to the causes. Finally, plan how to measure whether motivation improves, using both behavior, such as turnover, and employees' views. Consider the concerns of the people who must approve the changes.

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This paper is an original model document written by our desk, not a submitted student paper and not an official Aspen University document. Read it for the moves, then write your own to the instructions in your classroom. If you want one built to your exact prompt and rubric, the first custom sample is free and arrives in 24 to 48 hours.

More MGT 464 and Business Administration sample papers

MGT 464 Module 2 questions, answered

What does MGT 464 Module 2 usually ask for?

Aspen's MGT 464 covers motivation in this module, so diagnosing a motivation problem with theories such as expectancy and equity and recommending changes is typical. Look at your classroom prompt.

What is expectancy theory?

Vroom's theory that motivation depends on expectancy (effort leads to performance), instrumentality (performance leads to rewards) and valence (the value of those rewards).

What is equity theory?

Adams's theory that people compare the ratio of their outcomes to inputs with others' ratios and are motivated to reduce perceived inequity.

Where can I find a free MGT 464 Module 2 sample paper?

The complete paper above diagnoses staff accountant motivation at a CPA firm using expectancy theory, equity theory and research on organizational justice.

What are the four types of organizational justice?

Distributive (fair outcomes), procedural (fair processes), interpersonal (respectful treatment) and informational (honest explanations), as distinguished in Colquitt and colleagues' meta-analysis.