| Course | EDO 820 Ethical Issues in Leading Organizations |
|---|---|
| Module | Module 6 |
| Paper type | Doctoral governance comparison |
| Length | About 1,031 words, 6 pages |
| Format | APA 7 student paper |
| School | Aspen University |
| Program | Doctor of Education |
| Updated | October 2026 |
Free sample paper for EDO 820 Module 6
One Act, Three Sectors: How Public, Private and Nonprofit Governance Would Have Checked a Leader Who Raided a Restricted Fund
Student Name
Doctor of Education Program, Aspen University
EDO 820: Ethical Issues in Leading Organizations
Instructor Name
Month Day, Year
One Act, Three Sectors: How Public, Private and Nonprofit Governance Would Have Checked a Leader Who Raided a Restricted Fund
Kinloch's chief executive, as earlier modules described, used a funder's restricted money to cover two payrolls during a state payment delay, told the board in stages and kept the funder uninformed. This paper asks whether the outcome would have differed in another sector. It imagines the same act by the director of a county human services department and by the chief executive of a private home health company, and compares how each organization's governance would have responded. All three organizations and their figures are invented, and legal rules are described only in general terms.
Three Organizations
In the public case, the director of a county human services department faces a delay in state reimbursement and considers moving money from a fund dedicated by law to youth housing into the general payroll account. In the private case, the chief executive of a home health company, owned by a private equity firm, faces the same Medicaid delay and considers using money held in escrow for a pending acquisition. At Kinloch, the chief executive drew on foundation money pledged to youth housing. In each case, money set aside for one purpose is used for another without the consent of those who set it aside.
Motives That Cut Both Ways
Perry and Wise (1990) proposed that public service motivation rests on three kinds of motives: rational motives, such as participation in policy formulation and commitment to a public program out of personal identification; norm-based motives, such as a desire to serve the public interest and loyalty to duty and government; and affective motives, such as commitment to a program from a genuine conviction about its social importance. They suggested that people with strong public service motivation would be drawn to public organizations and would perform better in them.
Such motives are a strength of public and nonprofit leaders, and the Kinloch chief executive had them in abundance. But they also supply the material for the justification examined in earlier modules: a leader deeply committed to his clients can more easily believe that serving them justifies breaking a rule. Strong service motives therefore need governance that channels them, not governance that assumes they guarantee good conduct.
What Boards Do
Miller-Millesen (2003) argued that nonprofit boards do not all perform the same roles, and that three theories predict which roles a board will emphasize. Agency theory predicts that boards will monitor executives on behalf of owners or, in nonprofits, the community. Resource dependence theory predicts that boards will help the organization secure resources and manage its environment. Institutional theory predicts that boards will adopt practices that conform to sector expectations and confer legitimacy. Which roles dominate depends on the organization's circumstances, such as its dependence on particular funders and the uncertainty it faces.
Kinloch's board fits the resource dependence and institutional pattern. Its members were recruited for their connections to donors, foundations and county officials, and for the standing they lent the agency. Monitoring the chief executive was not what most had joined to do, and the board's finance committee met only quarterly.
Governance Is Not Solved Elsewhere
Daily et al. (2003) reviewed decades of research on corporate governance. They observed that the field had relied heavily on agency theory, which focuses on aligning managers' interests with owners' through board independence, incentives and monitoring, and that the empirical evidence linking such structures to firm performance and to the prevention of managerial misconduct was mixed. They called for broader theoretical perspectives, including resource dependence, and for attention to board processes rather than only board composition.
The review cautions against assuming that the private home health company would have prevented the act simply because it has owners with money at stake. Owners and boards with strong incentives monitor some things closely and others not at all.
Comparing the Checks
| Check | County department | Private home health company | Kinloch |
|---|---|---|---|
| Rules on the funds | Statutory restriction; transfer illegal without approval | Escrow agreement enforceable by the counterparty | Grant agreement with the foundation |
| Who must approve | Elected county board | Private equity owners or their board representatives | Volunteer board, mostly recruited by the chief executive |
| Who would notice | County auditor; budget office; public records requests | Owners' financial reviews; lenders; auditors | Annual auditor; funder months later |
| Motive of overseers to look | Political accountability; legal duty | Financial stake | Goodwill; reputation |
| Likely speed of detection | Days to weeks | Weeks | Months |
Why Speed of Detection Matters
The comparison table shows detection time ranging from days in the public case to months at Kinloch. Detection time matters ethically, not only practically. The longer an exception stays hidden, the more it shapes behavior around it: the finance director's records, the senior team's silence and the leader's own sense that the matter was handled. Early detection also protects the leader, since an act reviewed within days can still be reversed or approved openly, while one discovered by an auditor months later appears as concealment whatever the original intent. Governance that shortens detection time gives leaders a reason to disclose and followers a reason to speak.
Changes for Kinloch
Kinloch cannot import a county's statutes or an owner's financial stake, but it can strengthen its board's monitoring role. First, an independent finance and audit committee, chaired by a member with financial expertise not recruited by the chief executive, should meet monthly. Second, a written policy should require board approval and funder notification before any use of restricted funds outside their purpose, and give the finance director the duty to report any such proposal to the committee chair. Third, board terms should be limited and nominations handled by a governance committee rather than the chief executive, balancing the resource and monitoring roles Miller-Millesen describes.
Conclusion
The same act would likely have been detected faster in a county department or a private company, though neither sector guarantees prevention. Perry and Wise show that service motives can both protect and endanger ethics, Miller-Millesen explains why Kinloch's board was not built to monitor and Daily, Dalton and Cannella warn that private-sector structures are no cure. Strengthening monitoring within a nonprofit's own governance is the change that fits.
References
Daily, C. M., Dalton, D. R., & Cannella, A. A., Jr. (2003). Corporate governance: Decades of dialogue and data. Academy of Management Review, 28(3), 371-382. https://doi.org/10.5465/amr.2003.10196703
Miller-Millesen, J. L. (2003). Understanding the behavior of nonprofit boards of directors: A theory-based approach. Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 32(4), 521-547. https://doi.org/10.1177/0899764003257463
Perry, J. L., & Wise, L. R. (1990). The motivational bases of public service. Public Administration Review, 50(3), 367-373. https://doi.org/10.2307/976618
What the EDO 820 Module 6 instructions ask for
The sixth EDO 820 module covers ethics in public, private and nonprofit governance, and the assignment usually wants a comparison of how governance in different sectors shapes, prevents or permits ethical failures. Defer to the Module 6 instructions in your classroom; the organizations here are invented. Describe governance arrangements in each sector. Consider what motivates leaders in each and who holds them accountable. Compare how each sector would detect or prevent a specific ethical failure. Draw on governance theory, not only description. Recommend governance changes for one organization, and list each source in APA 7 style.
Inside the EDO 820 Module 6 example
In the county department, the director moving dedicated funds would face statutory budget controls, an elected board, an auditor and public records law. In the private home health company, the chief executive would face owners or a board with financial incentives to monitor, lenders' covenants and auditors. At Kinloch, he faced a self-perpetuating volunteer board he had largely recruited, an annual audit and a funder who learned months later. Perry and Wise (Public Administration Review) explain why public and nonprofit leaders' service motives can be strengths that also invite self-justification. Miller-Millesen (Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly) explains why Kinloch's board acted more as a resource-gathering and legitimizing body than as a monitor. Daily, Dalton and Cannella (Academy of Management Review) caution that even monitoring boards in firms do not reliably prevent misconduct. Changes include an independent finance committee, a fund-restriction policy and term limits.
Where the marks sit in the EDO 820 Module 6 rubric
Governance comparison papers earn credit when the comparison is systematic and grounded in theory rather than a list of features. This example holds the act constant and varies the sector, which makes the differences in checks clear. Perry and Wise add the motivational side, showing that public service motives cut both ways. Miller-Millesen explains the nonprofit board's behavior through theory, and Daily, Dalton and Cannella keep the paper from assuming that private-sector governance solves the problem. The recommendations address the specific weaknesses the comparison found, and the paper is careful to describe legal rules only in general terms.
EDO 820 Module 6 help: mistakes that cost marks
Sector comparisons often describe each sector's governance in general and stop there. Hold one ethical failure constant and show how each sector would respond to it. Another weakness is assuming that one sector, often the private, has better governance; research on corporate boards shows mixed results. Use theory to explain why boards behave as they do, such as agency and resource dependence. Consider leaders' motivations, which differ by sector and can both protect and endanger ethics. Finally, recommend changes suited to the organization's sector rather than importing another sector's model wholesale, and explain what each change costs the organization in time, money or flexibility.
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EDO 820 Module 6 questions, answered
What does EDO 820 Module 6 usually ask for?
Aspen's EDO 820 covers ethics in public, private and nonprofit governance in this module, so comparing how governance in each sector shapes or prevents ethical failures is typical. Check your Module 6 prompt.
What motivates public service?
Perry and Wise described rational, norm-based and affective motives, from personal identification with programs to a desire to serve the public interest.
What do nonprofit boards actually do?
Miller-Millesen showed that theories predict different roles: monitoring under agency theory, gathering resources under resource dependence and conforming under institutional theory.
Where can I find a free EDO 820 Module 6 sample paper?
The comparison above is free: how public, private and nonprofit governance would check an invented leader who diverted restricted funds.
Do corporate boards prevent misconduct?
Daily, Dalton and Cannella's review found mixed evidence that board structures based on agency theory improve monitoring or performance.